Connected Insulin Pump Security Risk Assessment Checklist for Manufacturers
A connected insulin pump’s cybersecurity assessment should trace risks from software and hardware components through the systems, people, and processes that can affect insulin delivery. Use this checklist to connect technical findings to potential patient harm, verify mitigations, and maintain risk controls throughout the device lifecycle.
The FDA’s 2026 medical device cybersecurity guidance describes recommendations for managing cybersecurity risks in device design and premarket submissions. Its guidance is nonbinding; applicable statutory and regulatory requirements remain distinct. Manufacturers should tailor their assessment to the specific pump, intended use, system architecture, and use environment.
What systems and lifecycle stages should the assessment cover?
Define the assessment boundary around the complete insulin-pump system—not only the pump’s embedded software. Consider any connected component or service that could affect pump function, therapy decisions, device settings, or the availability and integrity of supporting information.
- Device and accessories: the pump, control units, charging or docking equipment, programming tools, and other accessories that exchange data or support operation.
- Connected products: compatible continuous glucose monitors, mobile apps, phones, remote controls, and other devices that supply readings, commands, or alerts.
- Networked services: cloud platforms, clinician or caregiver portals, data-sharing services, application programming interfaces, and manufacturer-operated systems.
- Development and support systems: software build and signing environments, update servers, manufacturing systems, service tools, and third-party software or hardware dependencies.
- Use environments: home and clinical settings, wireless networks, shared or replacement phones, travel, and situations where a user may rely on the pump without immediate support.
Map risks across the total product lifecycle: concept and design, development and testing, manufacturing, distribution, setup, routine use, servicing, software updates, vulnerability response, and end-of-support or retirement. FDA’s current cybersecurity guidance describes lifecycle security processes that can extend through design, release, support, and decommissioning.
For each stage, identify who owns the security decision, what evidence is retained, and how changes trigger reassessment. Include foreseeable misuse and changes in the operating environment, such as a phone or connected service being replaced or a third-party component receiving an update.
Which assets, users, interfaces, and trust boundaries should manufacturers identify?
Create an inventory of assets and data flows, then draw a system diagram showing where information enters, leaves, or changes trust level. This is the foundation for medical device threat modeling: it helps teams see which paths could expose pump functions or information to an unauthorized or unreliable source.
- Safety-critical assets: basal and bolus settings, delivery commands, insulin-delivery state, alarms, clock and schedule data, and firmware or configuration files.
- Supporting assets: glucose readings, therapy history, user and clinician credentials, pairing records, logs, encryption keys, update packages, and software bills of materials.
- Users and roles: patients, caregivers, clinicians, service personnel, manufacturer support staff, developers, suppliers, and administrators of connected services.
- Interfaces: wireless radio links, mobile and web apps, USB or service ports, clinician programming interfaces, cloud connections, APIs, and update channels.
- Trust boundaries: transitions between the pump and a phone, pump and glucose monitor, user and clinician accounts, device and cloud, manufacturer and supplier, and signed software and running firmware.
For each interface, record what data or commands can cross it, which party is permitted to initiate them, what authentication and authorization apply, and what happens if communication is interrupted, delayed, replayed, or corrupted. Include normal and degraded operating conditions rather than assuming reliable connectivity.
Use architecture views and data-flow diagrams to document key components, external dependencies, and security controls. FDA’s cybersecurity guidance recommends assessing device architecture, interfaces, third-party components, and use environments as part of security risk management.
How can threats to insulin delivery and patient safety be assessed?
Translate each plausible attack or failure into a clinical hazard scenario. An insulin delivery hazard analysis should examine whether an attacker, compromised component, or loss of function could cause too much insulin, too little insulin, delayed therapy, misleading information, or the loss of an alarm a user depends on.
- Unauthorized or altered basal rates, bolus commands, schedules, or other therapy settings.
- Replay, spoofing, or modification of data or commands exchanged with a phone, glucose monitor, or remote service.
- Compromised firmware or configuration that changes pump behavior or weakens safety checks.
- Blocked, delayed, or misleading readings, alerts, or status messages that affect a therapy decision.
- Denial of service, depleted power, or communications failure that prevents a feature from working when needed.
- Unauthorized pairing, access to service functions, or misuse of legitimate credentials.
For every scenario, document the threat source, vulnerable asset or interface, conditions required for exploitation, affected safety function, possible patient harm, and existing safeguards. Consider direct effects on insulin delivery as well as indirect effects—for example, incorrect information or a missed alert that could influence a patient or clinician’s decision.
FDA’s postmarket cybersecurity guidance specifically uses the potential impact of a vulnerability on an insulin pump’s dosage as an example of why patient-harm severity matters when assessing cybersecurity risks. Test scenarios in controlled environments and confirm that security testing itself cannot trigger unintended delivery on devices used for patient care.
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Select controls according to the architecture and assessed risks. A control is useful only when it works as intended in the device’s real operating environment and does not create a new safety problem.
- Protect access: authenticate users, devices, and services; restrict permissions by role; and limit access to programming, service, and administrative functions.
- Secure wireless exchanges: use appropriate wireless device authentication and cryptographic protections, and protect against unauthorized pairing, message alteration, and replay.
- Protect therapy settings: authorize changes to safety-critical settings, validate values and command sequences, and record relevant changes for review.
- Verify software integrity: use firmware integrity verification so the pump can identify unauthorized or corrupted software and handle failed checks safely.
- Secure updates: authenticate update packages, protect their integrity, and design update and recovery processes to preserve essential performance if installation is interrupted.
- Support resilience and detection: log security-relevant events where appropriate, monitor for abnormal activity, and define safe responses to lost communications, failed authentication, or corrupted data.
- Reduce third-party risk: track software components, assess relevant supplier vulnerabilities, and maintain a software bill of materials for applicable components.
Verify controls through documented testing, including cybersecurity testing and software validation. Test authentication and authorization boundaries, update and recovery behavior, data integrity, failure handling, and interactions with connected components. Reassess risks when a design, supplier, interface, or operating assumption changes.
FDA’s 2026 guidance describes security objectives including authenticity and integrity, authorization, availability, confidentiality, and secure, timely updates. It also includes recommendations for control categories such as authentication, cryptography, code and data integrity, event detection, resilience, and firmware updates.
How should manufacturers evaluate and document pre- and post-mitigation risk?
Set cybersecurity risk acceptability criteria before evaluating individual scenarios. Define how the team will consider exploitability, severity of potential patient harm, affected safety and essential performance, existing safeguards, uncertainty, and the effectiveness of proposed controls.
For each scenario, document the initial risk and the reasons for its rating. Consider whether exploitation is practical in the relevant environment and what could happen if it succeeds. Technical severity scores may help prioritize investigation, but the assessment should also address the likelihood and consequences of patient harm for the specific pump and use context.
Then assess each proposed mitigation and record the residual risk. Include evidence that the control works, any compensating controls, assumptions that remain, risks introduced by the mitigation, and the rationale for deciding whether the remaining patient risk is acceptable. If residual risk is not acceptable under the established criteria, identify additional action, such as design changes, user communication, or a field response.
Maintain traceable records linking assets, threat scenarios, hazards, risk decisions, requirements, implemented controls, test results, and approvals. FDA’s postmarket guidance recommends assessing both vulnerability exploitability and the severity of patient harm, accounting for compensating controls, and determining whether risk is controlled or uncontrolled using a documented process tailored to the device.
How can teams monitor vulnerabilities and manage remediation throughout the device lifecycle?
Establish postmarket cybersecurity monitoring that can identify new issues affecting the pump, its software components, connected products, suppliers, and supporting services. Assign responsibility for monitoring and triage, and define how new information leads to a risk reassessment.
- Track vulnerabilities and security notices relevant to the device and its software bill of materials.
- Review reports from users, service teams, suppliers, security researchers, and other appropriate sources.
- Provide a coordinated vulnerability disclosure process with a secure reporting channel, acknowledgment, investigation, coordinated communication, and remediation planning.
- Prioritize findings by considering exploitability, potential patient harm, affected versions, exposure, and available mitigations.
- Validate updates and patches to confirm that they address the vulnerability without impairing insulin delivery, alarms, essential performance, or other safeguards.
- Communicate relevant risks, mitigations, update instructions, and remaining risks to affected users and stakeholders in clear, actionable language.
- Review whether changes require regulatory assessment or reporting, based on the device, change, and applicable requirements.
For devices that meet the statutory definition of a “cyber device” and are covered by a qualifying premarket submission, section 524B of the FD&C Act includes requirements concerning plans to monitor, identify, and address postmarket vulnerabilities, processes to maintain cybersecurity and provide updates and patches, and a software bill of materials. Check the FDA’s cybersecurity FAQs for the scope and details; do not assume every connected product or submission is covered identically.
Keep monitoring active through servicing and the supported life of the device. Reassess risk when new vulnerabilities, incidents, threat information, software changes, or field experience affect earlier assumptions. A strong program connects lifecycle monitoring, patient-safety analysis, tested remediation, and clear communication so that security decisions remain grounded in their potential effect on insulin delivery.
FAQs
What connected components should an insulin pump security assessment include?
Include the pump, accessories, control and mobile apps, compatible glucose monitors, phones, wireless links, cloud services, clinician or caregiver portals, APIs, update infrastructure, service tools, and relevant third-party components. Assess each component and interface that could affect pump settings, insulin delivery, therapy information, alarms, or device availability.
How can a cybersecurity vulnerability affect insulin delivery?
A vulnerability could enable unauthorized changes to settings or commands, interfere with information or communications used in therapy, or disrupt pump functions. The possible effects depend on the specific vulnerability and system safeguards, so assess each scenario for its potential effect on insulin delivery and patient safety.
How should manufacturers determine whether residual risk is acceptable?
Use documented, device-specific criteria that consider exploitability, potential severity of patient harm, existing controls, compensating measures, uncertainty, and the risks introduced by remediation. Record the evidence and rationale for the decision, and take further action when residual risk does not meet the established criteria.
How should manufacturers handle newly discovered insulin pump vulnerabilities?
Receive and acknowledge the report through a defined process, assess exploitability and potential patient harm, determine whether users need immediate mitigations or communications, and develop and validate appropriate remediation. Reassess risk as new information arrives, coordinate disclosure, and evaluate applicable regulatory actions. FDA’s postmarket guidance recommends ongoing risk management and a coordinated vulnerability disclosure policy and practice.
Table of Contents
- What systems and lifecycle stages should the assessment cover?
- Which assets, users, interfaces, and trust boundaries should manufacturers identify?
- How can threats to insulin delivery and patient safety be assessed?
- Which security controls protect firmware, pump settings, and communications?
- How should manufacturers evaluate and document pre- and post-mitigation risk?
- How can teams monitor vulnerabilities and manage remediation throughout the device lifecycle?
- FAQs
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