How Hospitals Should Respond to VPN Vulnerability Exploits

Kevin Henry

Incident Response

Published Updated

8 minutes read
Share this article
How Hospitals Should Respond to VPN Vulnerability Exploits

How should hospitals patch and contain an exploited VPN vulnerability?

Treat an exploited VPN appliance as a potential entry point—not simply as a device that needs an update. Activate the incident response plan, identify the appliance model and affected versions, and follow the manufacturer’s security advisory and remediation instructions. If available, compare the vulnerability against CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog to help prioritize action.

With incident responders and clinical operations leaders, decide whether to restrict external access, isolate the appliance, or disable the affected VPN service. Choose the least disruptive action that adequately reduces risk; a hospital may need alternate, approved access for staff and vendors. Preserve relevant evidence before changes such as a factory reset or rebuild, where feasible, and document actions and timestamps. CISA’s incident and vulnerability response playbooks describe containment and evidence preservation as coordinated response activities.

Apply the vendor’s remediation, including the correct VPN appliance firmware, only after determining whether compromise may already have occurred. Patching closes a vulnerability but does not, by itself, establish that an attacker’s access or persistence has been removed. For some exploited VPN appliances, CISA and partner agencies have advised assuming administrative compromise, investigating connected systems, and reimaging affected hosts. Follow the advisory for the specific product and vulnerability rather than assuming every appliance requires the same steps.

Coordinate containment, patching, credential changes, and restoration with the appliance vendor and incident response team. Record what was changed and verify the device and its connections before returning them to service.

Which logs and network artifacts should incident responders preserve?

Preserve evidence promptly, including its source, collection time, and handling history. Store copies in a protected location with access limited to authorized responders; avoid relying on logs that may be overwritten or reside only on a potentially compromised appliance. NIST’s SP 800-61 Rev. 3 recommends collecting and retaining incident evidence while safeguarding its integrity and provenance.

Collect available VPN appliance logs and configuration records, including successful and failed logins, user and administrator activity, source addresses, connection times, session details, assigned addresses, configuration changes, and system events. Preserve identity-provider and multifactor authentication enforcement records, directory and privileged-account activity, and relevant endpoint detection and response (EDR) alerts. HHS recommends collecting and preserving logs and other artifacts during security incident response; its guidance on security incident procedures discusses using logs to investigate when and how an intruder entered and what they did.

Also preserve firewall, DNS, proxy, and network flow logs; remote access and administrative-service records; and relevant server, cloud, and electronic health record audit logs. Gather appliance configuration backups, firmware and update history, relevant endpoint data, and records of security tools or backup systems that may show changes or access. The useful sources depend on how the hospital’s systems are configured and what telemetry was available at the time.

Keep a timeline of collection and response actions. The HHS Office for Civil Rights guidance also recommends documenting incident findings, affected systems, mitigation, recovery, and evidence collected.

How can hospitals investigate unauthorized access and lateral movement?

Build a timeline that links VPN sessions to identity-provider events, endpoint activity, internal network connections, and access to clinical or administrative systems. Look for unexpected login times or source locations, unfamiliar devices, new or elevated accounts, unusual configuration changes, suspicious remote administration, and connections to systems the user does not ordinarily access.

Use network flow logs and firewall, DNS, and proxy records to trace which systems communicated with the VPN appliance or accounts connected through it. Review EDR alerts and host records for suspicious processes, credential access, persistence mechanisms, or movement to additional devices. These are investigation leads, not proof on their own; compare them with normal activity, relevant system owners, and the incident timeline.

Investigate connected systems even if the VPN appliance itself provides limited forensic data. In its advisory on exploited Ivanti gateways, CISA and partner agencies note that appliance artifacts may be limited and recommend examining associated network devices for evidence of lateral movement.

Determine which accounts, systems, applications, and data may have been accessed, and whether the activity is ongoing. Preserve the basis for those conclusions and report uncertainties. If the incident involves electronic protected health information (ePHI), involve the hospital’s privacy and legal teams in assessing the facts and any applicable obligations; HHS notes that breach determinations depend on the circumstances of the incident in its ransomware and HIPAA guidance.

Ready to simplify HIPAA compliance?

Join thousands of organizations that trust Accountable to manage their compliance needs.

Get Started Free Today

How should hospitals strengthen VPN and privileged-account access?

After containing the incident and using a trusted system for administrative work, reset credentials that may have been exposed. Review and revoke active sessions or tokens where appropriate, and rotate affected VPN keys, service credentials, and other secrets according to the incident team’s assessment. CISA’s Ivanti gateway advisory recommends resetting credentials that may have been exposed.

Enforce multifactor authentication for remote and privileged access, including administrator accounts, and review exceptions rather than assuming MFA alone prevents compromise. CISA identifies unenforced MFA and insufficient remote-service controls as weaknesses in its guidance on commonly exploited security controls. MFA is an important safeguard, but it does not replace patching, monitoring, or investigation of suspicious sessions.

Use privileged access management to limit who can administer the VPN, servers, identity systems, and clinical applications. Apply least privilege, separate routine and administrative accounts, restrict vendor access to approved systems and time periods, and segment the network so a remote connection does not automatically grant broad internal reach. Review access rules and account activity regularly, and alert on anomalous logins and privilege changes. HHS’s healthcare teleworking and VPN guidance recommends maintaining and monitoring VPN accounts and reviewing abnormal activity.

How can hospitals maintain clinical operations during incident response?

Coordinate cybersecurity response with clinical leadership, patient safety, facilities, communications, and operational teams. If VPN access must be restricted, tell affected staff and vendors which approved alternatives remain available and how to request access. Avoid improvised connections or workarounds that bypass security controls.

Activate and adapt downtime procedures to the systems affected. Depending on the outage, these may include paper documentation, downtime computers, established phone or radio communications, and workflows for patient identification, medication, laboratory, imaging, and transfer services. HHS’s Operational Continuity-Cyber Incident Checklist describes clinical downtime and continuity planning for healthcare organizations.

Prioritize restoration according to patient-care needs and test restored services before reconnecting them. Maintain protected, tested ransomware recovery backups and verify that restored data and systems are suitable for use. HHS explains that HIPAA contingency planning for regulated entities includes backup, disaster recovery, and emergency mode operations to continue critical processes in its ransomware guidance.

Keep clinical teams informed as the situation changes, including which services are available, what downtime processes apply, and how to report safety concerns. Continuity plans should support both immediate care needs and a potentially extended recovery.

What limitations should hospitals consider when assessing possible compromise?

A vulnerability being patched does not prove that the appliance or connected systems are clean. Attackers may have obtained credentials, created other access paths, or moved to systems beyond the VPN. Similarly, a lack of alerts or visible lateral movement indicators does not establish that no unauthorized activity occurred.

Investigators may face incomplete logs, limited appliance access, overwritten records, or gaps in network flow logs and EDR coverage. A VPN appliance may not retain enough detail to reconstruct every session or action. Document what evidence was available, what could not be collected, and how those limits affect confidence in the assessment.

Multifactor authentication enforcement reduces certain account risks but cannot, on its own, rule out exploitation or unauthorized use of an existing session. CISA has documented VPN-related incidents involving credential theft and session hijacking in its joint guide to modern network access security. Consider these limitations when deciding whether to keep access restricted, expand the investigation, or restore services.

Balance evidence collection and containment against patient-care needs, and involve incident response, clinical operations, privacy, and legal teams in decisions that affect both. In short, patch the vulnerability, investigate beyond the appliance, protect affected accounts, preserve evidence, and maintain safe clinical operations while the hospital verifies recovery.

FAQs.

Should a hospital disable a VPN service while investigating an exploit?

Not automatically. The hospital should assess the risk of continued access against the clinical and operational impact of disabling the service. Restricting external access, isolating the appliance, or disabling the affected service may be appropriate, but coordinate the decision with incident responders and clinical operations and provide approved alternatives where needed.

What logs should hospitals preserve after a VPN vulnerability is exploited?

Preserve VPN appliance authentication, session, administrator, configuration, and system logs, along with identity and multifactor authentication records, firewall and network flow logs, DNS and proxy data, EDR alerts, and relevant server, cloud, and electronic health record audit logs. Collect available configuration, firmware, and endpoint artifacts, and record when and how evidence was gathered.

How can hospitals protect privileged accounts during incident response?

Use trusted systems to reset credentials suspected of exposure, revoke potentially compromised sessions or tokens, and rotate affected keys and service secrets as appropriate. Enforce multifactor authentication, limit administrative privileges through privileged access management, review account activity, and restrict access to the systems and tasks each administrator needs.

How can hospitals maintain patient care if VPN access is disrupted?

Activate downtime and continuity procedures, coordinate with clinical leaders, and use approved alternatives such as paper documentation, downtime computers, and established communications channels. Prioritize restoration by patient-care needs, verify restored services before reconnecting them, and use tested ransomware recovery backups where needed.

Share this article

Ready to simplify HIPAA compliance?

Join thousands of organizations that trust Accountable to manage their compliance needs.

Get Started Free Today

Related Articles